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CONGRESSIONAL SELF-DISCIPLINE: THE POWER
TO EXPEL, TO EXCLUDE AND TO PUNISH
GERALD T. McLAUGHLIN*
R ECENT events have again focused attention on Congress' power to
discipline its members for personal misconduct. On April 19, 1972,
the House Committee on Standards of Official Conduct1 recommended that
Texas Representative John Dowdy be stripped of his right to vote on the
floor of the House or in committee as a result of his conviction for bribery
and perjury.2 On that same day, two Senators argued before the Supreme
Court that the Constitution forbids the executive branch from investigating
the official conduct of a member of Congress, and delegates all responsibil-
ity for punishing members' wrongdoing to each house of Congress.3 Finally,
on June 29, 1972, a Supreme Court majority in United States v. Brewster,'
while holding that a former Senator was not immune to criminal prosecu-
tion for accepting a bribe while in office, commented that Congress did not
have specifically articulated standards for the discipline of its members, '
and that in a disciplinary proceeding a member of Congress "is at the
mercy of an almost unbridled discretion of the charging body .... "I
The Constitution provides Congress with three specific powers to disci-
pline its own members: the power to expel, the power to exclude and the
power to punish.' Congress needs these powers primarily for two reasons.
First, both the Senate and the House of Representatives must maintain
their own institutional integrity and the "proper functioning of the legis-
lative process."' Second, each house possesses certain privileges which
guarantee Congress' existence as a separate but equal branch of govern-
ment. Not the least of these is the privilege which protects a Senator or
* Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University. Professor McLaughlin received his
BA. from Fordham University, and his LL.B from New York University, where he was
Managing Editor of the Law Review.
1. See note 22 infra.
2. Wall St. '., April 20, 1972, at 1, col. 3.
When a member of Congress has been indicted for a felony, the House of Representatives
and the Senate usually do not take action until after the conclusion of judicial proceed-
ings. R. Getz, Congressional Ethics 90 (1966) (hereinafter cited as Getz].
3. N.Y. Times, April 20, 1972, at 8, col. 1.
4. 408 U.S. 501 (1972).
5. Id. at 519. See In re Chapman, 166 U.S. 661, 669-70 (1897).
6. 408 U.S. at 519.
7. U.S. Const. art. I, § 5. The power to exclude is inferred from the power of each
house to judge the qualifications of its members.
8. Special Committee on Congressional Ethics, Association of the Bar of the City of
New York, Congress and the Public Trust 202 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Congress and the
Public Trust].
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Representative from being questioned elsewhere about his acts or speeches
in Congress.' If a member of Congress is to enjoy such a broad privilege,
Congress requires its own in-house disciplinary sanctions to guard against
the abuse of that privilege.' 0 In effect then, Congress' power of self-
discipline is necessitated both by its internal workings and by its relation-
ship with the other branches of the federal government.
At the same time, however, the power of Congress to expel, to exclude or
to punish a member is itself limited by the people's right to elect whomever
they wish to represent them." Congress' power to discipline its members
and the people's right to choose their representatives have collided in the
past' and will undoubtedly do so again in the future. This article explores
one half of that critical tension: Congress' powers of self-discipline. To
that end, the article treats each of Congress' disciplinary powers separately
to demonstrate that there are definite procedural and substantive rules
which limit the exercise of these powers-rules which do approximate those
"specifically articulated standards" whose existence the Supreme Court
majority in Brewster denied. 3
9. U.S. Const. art. I, § 6. The privilege protects members of Congress from inquiry Into
legislative acts or the motivation behind legislative acts. The privilege does not cover all
conduct relating to the legislative process. United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 516
(1972). For other recent discussions of the congressional privilege, see Gravel v. United States,
408 U.S. 606 (1972); Gravel, Congressional Privilege: The Case of Sen. Gravel, 167 N.Y.L.J.,
March 31, 1972, at 1, col. 1.
10. "If Congress did not police itself, its Members would be above all law in the areas
protected by Congressional immunity, a concept alien to our legal system and never In-
tended by the framers of the Constitution." Congress and the Public Trust, supra note 8,
at 203.
A discussion of when Congress has exclusive jurisdiction to punish a member is beyond
the scope of this article. Suffice it to say that in the areas protected by Congressional im.
munity, Congress alone may punish a member. See United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S.
501, 518 (1972). Outside of this area, however, Congress as well as appropriate federal, state
or local authorities may discipline a member. Usually Congress will not seek to punish a
member until after the conclusion of any judicial proceedings brought against him. Cf,
note 2 supra.
The Supreme Court majority in United States v. Brewster remarked that Congress is
ill-equipped to investigate, try and punish its members for conduct that is loosely and Inci-
dentally related to the legislative process. 408 U.S. at 518.
11. "A fundamental principle of our representative democracy is, in Hamilton's words,
'that the people should choose whom they please to govern them. . . .' As Madison pointed
out at the [Constitutional] Convention, this principle is undermined as much by limiting
whom the people can select as by limiting the franchise itself." Powell v. McCormack,
395 U.S. 486, 547 (1969) (citation omitted).
12. Adam Clayton Powell was excluded from the 90th Congress but was overwhelmingly
re-elected by his constituents. It was not until the 91st Congress two years later, and only
after a long court battle, that Powell was finally seated.
13. See notes 5 & 6 supra and accompanying text.
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I. ExPULsioN
Article I, section 5, clause 2 of the Constitution provides: "Each House
may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its Members for dis-
orderly behavior, and with the concurrence of two thirds, expel a mem-
ber."
Once a Senator or Representative has been administered the oath of
office and takes his seat, he cannot be required to surrender that seat with-
out a two-thirds vote of the particular house (expulsion).14 On the other
hand, if a member has not been seated, a simple majority of the house can
prevent him from taking his seat (exclusion).15 The seating of a member
thus becomes critical because thereafter the member cannot be removed
except by expulsion, requiring the concurrence of two-thirds of his col-
leagues. It is true that certain rights of a seated member may be tem-
porarily suspended by a majority vote as a punishment, but suspension
does not deprive a member of his seat." If a house votes to expel or
exclude a member, however, the seat thereby becomes vacant and a
special election must be held.' 7
Except for the requirement of a two-thirds majority, the Constitution
does not explicitly restrict Congress' power to expel. This does not mean,
however, that the power of expulsion is untrammelled. Certain limitations,
both procedural and substantive, restrict Congress' exercise of this sanc-
tion.
A. Procedural Restraints
1. Participation in Expulsion Proceedings
In Powell v. McCormack,"5 the Supreme Court remarked that a member
may as a matter of right address his colleagues and participate fully in the
debate on his expulsion, while a member-elect whose exclusion is under
consideration apparently does not have the same right."9 Although a mem-
14. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 507 n.27 (1969). There may be one exception
to this rule, however. See text accompanying notes 60-61 infra.
15. 395 U.S. 486, 507 n.27.
16. For a discussion of suspension, see Hobbs, Comments on Powell v. McCormack, 17
U.C.LA.L. Rev. 129, 151-52 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Hobbs].
17. U.S. Const. art. I, § 2, cl. 4 provides: "When vacancies happen in the representation
from any State, the Executive authority thereof shall issue writs of election to fill such
vacancies." U.S. Cost. amend. XVII, cL 2 provides that in the case of the Senate the
legislature of any state may empower the executive thereof to make temporary appoint-
ments until the people fill the vacancies by election as the legislature may direct.
18. 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
19. Id. at 510 n.30 (1969). This comment may have greater significance than at first
appears. As one commentator remarked: "This also might be interpreted as an indication of
1972]
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ber-elect may be permitted to speak in his own behalf, 0 a seated Senator
or Representative, as an already functioning member of Congress, would
seem to have the stronger claim to participate in the debate over his ex-
pulsion.
Although not specifically required by rule or court decision, reasonable
procedural rights should be extended to a member whose expulsion is
being considered: the right to attend with counsel any relevant committee
hearings, the right to have witnesses subpoenaed in his defense, the right
to have a written statement of the accusations made against him, the right
to a transcript of all hearings where testimony is taken and the right to
cross-examine his accusers.2 ' Since the appropriate committee of the
House or Senate will usually investigate the allegations made against the
member and recommend a course of action to the full body, it is impera-
tive that these procedural rights be afforded in the committee hearings.22
To permit the exercise of certain of these rights during a full Senate or
House debate on a member's expulsion may be unwieldy.23 In any event
a willingness on the part of the Court to pass constitutional judgment on the appropriate-
ness of House procedures. There is, however, a more important implication, namely, that
the Court possesses the competence to determine exactly what those procedures are." Hobbs,
supra note 16, at 144.
For a discussion of the problems of jurisdiction and justiciability raised by these re-
marks, see Weckstein, Comments on Powell v. McCormack, 17 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 73, 77-89
(1969).
20. 1 A. Hinds, Precedents of the House of Representatives of the United States § 474
(1907) [hereinafter cited as Hinds).
21. In the expulsion proceedings brought against him, Senator John Smith of Ohio re-
quested that he be informed specifically of the charges against him, that he be allowed
to make a defense against such charges, and have process to compel the attendance of
witnesses and the privilege of being heard by counsel. The Senate permitted him to be
heard by counsel; the other requests were not granted, however. 2 Hinds, supra note 20,
§ 1264.
In United States v. Brewster, the Supreme Court expressed the view that the process of
disciplining a member in Congress is not without some risk of abuse since "it is not sur-
rounded with the panoply of protective shields that are present in a criminal case." 408 U.S.
at 519.
22. In 1964, the Senate established the Select Committee on Standards and Conduct to
investigate allegations of improper conduct on the part of Senators. Before recommending
any disciplinary action to the full Senate, the Committee must give the individuals con-
cerned due notice and an opportunity for a hearing. S. Res. 338, 88th Cong., 2d Sess.
§ 2(a)(2) 110 Cong. Rec. 16,939 (1964). Beyond this, there is no requirement that the
Committee grant a member being investigated any procedural rights.
In 1968 the House of Representatives established a Committee on Standards of Official
Conduct to investigate alleged wrongdoings of its members. Again, the only procedural
requirement is for notice and a hearing. H.R. Doc. No. 402, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. § 720,
Rule XI (19)(c)(2) (1968).
23. Counsel for Senator John Smith argued before the entire Senate during the debates
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Congress should remember that when it expels a member, it effectively
acts as a court24 and should be limited by reasonable due process require-
ment&n
2. Two-Thirds Majority
The most important limitation on Congress' use of the expulsion power
is the requirement that two-thirds of the membership of the particular
house concur. 6 Although Gouverneur Morris felt that a simple majority
should have the power to expel,27 James Madison urged the view that "ex-
pulsion was too important to be exercised by a bare majority of a quorum;
and in emergencies... [one] faction might be dangerously abused. " ' This
is one of several areas in the Constitution where a two-thirds majority is
required. By a two-thirds vote of both houses, Congress may remove an in-
capacitated President,29 override a Presidential veto 0 or propose a Con-
stitutional amendment.3 Similarly, a two-thirds vote of the Senate is nec-
essary to impeach a member of the executive or the federal judiciary. 2
All of these areas are of particular importance since they are integral to the
scheme of checks and balances under which the three branches of govern-
ment operate. Expulsion is no less important, not because it involves intra-
governmental checks and balances, but because it involves the people's
basic right to be represented in Congress by the member of their choice.
over his expulsion (1807). See 2 Hinds, supra note 20, § 1264. A member has been per-
mitted to cross-examine other members during the expulsion debate. Id. § 1643.
24. United States v. Brewster, 408 US. 501, 518 (1972).
25. Differing views have been expressed as to whether Congress could expel a member
based on evidence that would be inadmissible in court. See the committee report in the
expulsion case of John Smith of Ohio (1807) cited in 2 Hinds, supra note 20, § 1264, for
the position that ordinarily inadmissible evidence may be considered. For a different posi-
tion see the remarks of Senator Bayard of Delaware, Id. § 1269.
26. U.S. Const. art. I, § 5, d. 2.
By analogy to certain Supreme Court decisions, it could be argued that the majority re-
quired to expel a member is two-thirds of those present in each house (assuming the
presence of a quorum) and not of the entire membership. See National Prohibition Cases,
253 U.S. 350, 386 (1920) (a vote of two-thirds of those members present in each house is
sufficient for the adoption of a constitutional amendment); Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Kansas,
248 U.S. 276 (1919) (a Presidential veto might be overridden by a vote of two-thirds of
the members present).
27. Records of the Federal Convention of 1784, at 254 (M. Farrand ed. 1937).
28. C. Warren, The Making of the Constitution 424 (1928). See United States v.
Brewster, 408 U.S. 501 (1972) ("[Ilt would be somewhat naive to assume that the triers
would be wholly objective and free from considerations of party and politics and the
passions of the moment"). Id. at 519-20.
29. U.S. Const. amend. XXV, § 4.
30. Id. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
31. Id. art. V.
32. Id. art. I, § 3, cL 6.
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B. Substantive Restraints
In addition to these procedural limitations, are there substantive re-
straints which limit the expulsion power, or may Congress expel a member
for any reason whatever? There are convincing arguments that Congress'
power to expel is not unlimited.
1. Prior Misconduct
Both houses of Congress seem to distrust their power to expel a member
for misconduct committed either during prior Congresses or before en-
tering Congress.33 This distrust has been justified in several ways. To
those who view expulsion as a power given "to enable each house to
exercise its constitutional function of legislation unobstructed, 8 4 the
remedy is not warranted as long as the member's conduct does not ob-
struct this Congress in its legislative work. To those who claim that the
people are the final judge of the conduct of those who represent them,
"prior misconduct is pardoned . . . by the electorate." ' For whatever
reasons, Congress will probably not expel a member for prior miscon-
duct, except perhaps in extreme cases.80
2. Grounds for Expulsion
The Senate by a two-thirds vote may impeach a member of the executive
or a federal judge. The Constitution provides for impeachment for officials
of the executive and federal judiciary, but curiously, not for members of
Congress. Expulsion, which also requires a two-thirds vote, was doubtlessly
intended to be the equivalent punishment for members of Congress. 7 This
33. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 508-09 (1969). For cases in the House of
Representatives and Senate concerning prior misconduct, see 2 Hinds, supra note 20, §§ 1283-
89.
It is not clear to what extent Congress could discipline a former member for misconduct
occurring while he was a member. See United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501 (1972). Un-
doubtedly much would depend on whether the acts of the former member were within
the scope of congressional immunity. See note 9 supra.
34. H.R. Rep. No. 815, 44th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1876), cited in Powell v. McCormack,
395 U.S. 486, 509 n.29 (1969).
35. Hobbs, supra note 16, at 146.
36. Although it ultimately cleared him of all charges, a Senate committee did investigate
alleged prior misconduct by Senator Charles H. Dietrich of Nebraska (1904). It should
be noted, however, that Dietrich himself had requested the investigation. Senate Election,
Expulsion and Censure Cases from 1789-1960, Sen. Dec. No. 71, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 98
(1962) [hereinafter cited as Senate Cases].
For a view that the power to expel for prior misconduct is desirable, see Note, The Power
of a House of Congress to Judge the Qualifications of Its Members, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 673,
684 (1968).
37. See Congress and the Public Trust, supra note 8, at 204. An impeachment proceed-
[Vol. 41
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close identity between impeachment and expulsion should not be forgotten
when analyzing substantive restraints on Congress' power to expel.
While the Constitution is silent as to the offenses which would cause a
member to be expelled, it does mention offenses for which impeachment is
appropriate. Article II, section 4 provides that "[t]he President, Vice
President and all civil officers of the United States, shall be removed from
office on impeachment for, and conviction of, treason, bribery, or other
high crimes and misdemeanors." There can be little argument that treason
and bribery are proper grounds for impeachment since they are both
indictable offenses and involve a breach of the public trust. The meaning
of the phrase "other high crimes and misdemeanors," however, is less
clear. The use of the word "other" seems to imply that any additional
grounds for impeachment should be of the same serious nature as treason
and bribery and involve official misconduct. From the constitutional de-
bates, it is evident that the impeachment provisions were aimed at prevent-
ing "the possibility of tyrannical, oppressive, corrupt and willful use of the
power connected with a public office."381 Thus, to be impeachable, the con-
duct in question must either be an indictable offense which involves serious
consequences to the United States or, if not an indictable offense, one which
involves malicious or corrupt acts in the discharge of official duties, causing
great detriment to the United States.3 9
ing has been brought against only one member of Congress. On July 7, 1797 the House
decided to bring impeachment proceedings against William Blount of Tennessee. The charges
included a conspiracy to transfer to England property belonging to Spain in Florida and
Louisiana, thereby violating America's neutrality, and attempts to foment trouble between
certain Indian tribes and the United States. Blount was first expelled from the Senate; then
he attacked the jurisdiction of the Senate to try him for impeachment. His claim that he
could not be considered a "civil officer" of the United States subject to impeachment was
ultimately upheld by the Senate when it dismissed the impeachment proceedings. This result
has been considered a precedent for the proposition that members of Congress are not
impeachable. See Feerick, Impeaching Federal Judges: A Study of the Constitutional Pro-
visions, 39 Fordham L. Rev. 1, 25-26 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Feerick]; Senate Cases,
supra note 36, at 3.
On January 28, 1873, the Vice President asked the Senate to form a committee to in-
vestigate charges made against his character. The request was opposed because the Vice
President was not a member of the Senate who might be expelled, but an officer of
Government, who should be proceeded against by impeachment. The Vice President's re-
quest to appoint the committee was denied. 2 Hinds, supra note 20, § 1242. In this instance
the power to epel was considered the equivalent of impeachment.
See also id. § 1286, citing a House investigation report: "The office of the power of
expulsion is so much the same as that of the power to impeach that we think it may
be safely assumed that whatever would be a good cause of impeachment would also be a
good cause of expulsion."
38. Feerick, supra note 37, at 53.
39. Id. at 54-55 & n.286. Even though Congress may expel a member who commits an
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
It has been argued, however, that "an impeachable offense is whatever
the majority of the House of Representatives considers [it] to be at a
given moment in history; conviction results from whatever offense or
offenses two-thirds of the [Senate] considers to be sufficiently serious to
require removal of the accused from office." 40 Such arguments clearly go
too far. The Constitution does set limits on what acts may be considered
impeachable. An official's private and lawful conduct, outside the scope
of his office, cannot be the basis of impeachment since it is not indictable
and it does not involve a betrayal of the public trust. Thus, for example,
if a federal official has permitted excerpts from his book to be printed
near nude photographs and a caricature of the President, he has not com-
mitted an impeachable offense.4
If an official of the executive or a federal judge may be impeached only
for misconduct in office, Senators and Representatives should be expelled
only for similar conduct. As with impeachment, intimations that each
house of Congress has unlimited power to expel a member for any con-
duct whatsoever are wrong.42 Congress should exercise its expulsion
power only when a serious indictable offense has been perpetrated or when
the particular member of Congress has betrayed the public trust by mis-
conduct in office.
Even without reference to the impeachment provision, however, other
constitutional limitations would restrict Congress' exercise of its expulsion
power.43 The right to freedom of speech clearly restricts Congress' power
to expel a member for remarks made either in or outside Congress.44 In
indictable offense involving serious consequences to the United States, there must still be
the two-thirds vote to expel. Otherwise Congress, by a simple majority vote, could pass a
criminal statute, conviction under which would result in immediate forfeiture of a mem-
ber's seat. For a discussion of such problems, see Getz, supra note 2, at 91-92.
40. 116 Cong. Rec. 11913 (1970) (Remarks of Congressman Ford).
41. These were some of the numerous charges levelled against Justice William 0. Douglas.
See id. at 11916 (Remarks of Congressman Ford).
42. See In re Chapman, 166 U.S. 661, 669-70 (1897); Congress and the Public Trust,
supra note 8, at 203-204; 2 Hinds, supra note 20, § 1279 (committee report cited therein at
843). Congress has more latitude in punishing a member than in expelling him. See notes
117-20 infra and accompanying text.
43. See Weckstein, Comments on Powell v. McCormack, 17 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 73, 90
(1969) ; Note, The Power of a House of Congress to Judge the Qualifications of Its Members,
81 Harv. L. Rev. 673, 674-75 (1968).
In discussing the Senate's power to judge the qualifications of its members, the Supreme
Court observed that the exercise of this power was "subject only to the restraints imposed
by or found in the implications of the Constitution." Barry v. United States ex rel. Cun-
ningham, 279 U.S. 597, 614 (1929).
44. Of course, there are limitations even on a legislator's freedom of speech. If his remarks
are treasonable, Congress could rightly expel the member. The "speech and debate" clause
immunizes a member from being questioned "in any other place" but not in the House or
[Vol. 41
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Bond v. Floyd,5 the Supreme Court observed: "The interest of the
public in hearing all sides of a public issue is hardly advanced by ex-
tending more protection to citizen-critics than to legislators."4 Similarly, a
member could not be constitutionally expelled for his religious beliefs un-
less these beliefs were somehow detrimental to the country.47 Both the due
process clause and the equal protection clause would also be relevant in
this context. The due process clause would prohibit a house of Congress
from expelling a member on grounds that bear "no rational relation to
legitimate concerns of the legislature."4 The equal protection clause
would prevent Congress from arbitrarily expelling certain members on
grounds of wealth, age, race or profession. Finally, Congress would be
prohibited from employing bills of attainder or ex post facto laws in
order to expel a member.49
C. Expulsion Cases in the Senate
and House of Representatives
From an analysis of the Senate and House cases, several conclusions can
be drawn. First, expulsion is rarely used by either house. No member of
either the House or the Senate has been expelled since 1862 and there have
been few attempted expulsions in recent decades. Second, whenever the
House or the Senate has expelled a member, it has been for treason or dis-
Senate itself. In 1917 the Minnesota Commission of Public Safety presented a resolution to
the Senate "looking to the expulsion of Senator Robert M. La Follette 'as a teacher of dis-
loyalty and sedition, giving aid and comfort to our enemies, and hindering the Government
in the conduct of the war,' such petition being based upon a speech of alleged disloyal
nature .... " The committee investigating this and other charges against Senator La Follette
decided that the speech did not merit action by the Senate. Senate Cases, supra note 36, at 110.
Similarly, expulsion resolutions were introduced against two members of the House of
Representatives for words alleged to be treasonable (1864). 2 Hinds, supra note 20, §§ 1253-
54.
45. 385 U.S. 116 (1966).
46. Id. at 136.
47. In the unsuccessful attempt to expel him (1907), Senator Reed Smoot of Utah was
accused of 'membership in a religious hierarchy that countenanced and encouraged polygamy
and a united church and state contrary to the spirit of the Constitution... !' Senate Cases,
supra note 36, at 98. Clearly Congress did not consider these beliefs to be so harmful to the
United States as to merit expulsion. See also US. Const. art. VI, cl. 3, which prohibits any
religious test from being required as a qualification to any public office under the United
States.
48. Note, The Power of a House of Congress to Judge the Qualifications of Its Mfembers,
81 Harv. L. Rev. 673, 674 (1968). In another context, the Supreme Court has remarked:
"The Constitution empowers each house to determine its rules of proceedings. It may not by
its rules ignore constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights . .. ." United States v.
Ballin, 144 US. 1, 5 (1892).
49. U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cI. 3.
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loyalty. Even when Congressional committees have proposed a member's
expulsion, the offenses alleged have usually involved serious official mis-
conduct. Thus, it seems that in practice the Senate and House have equated
the grounds of expulsion with the grounds of impeachment.
1. Senate
In all, twenty-three Senators have been expelled.50 Twenty-two of the
twenty-three cases occurred during the Civil War; the only other instance,
that of William Blount of Tennessee, occurred in 1797. It is interesting to
note that the basis of expulsion in each case was treason or disloyalty.
Blount, for example, was expelled for plotting with the British to seize
Spanish Florida and Louisiana and for instigating trouble with the Indi-
ans.5 On February 15, 1862, Jesse D. Bright of Indiana was expelled be-
cause he had written a letter to Jefferson Davis introducing a friend who
wished "to dispose of what he regards a great improvement in firearms. "
Ten other Senators, although not expelled, have been the subject of
Senatorial expulsion proceedings.ce In four of these cases the basis for the
attempted expulsion was suspected treason or disloyalty. 4 Accepting bribes
or receiving compensation for services rendered before a department of the
Government was the charge in five other cases. 5 In the final case, Senator
Reed Smoot of Utah was charged with membership in a "religious bier-
50. They are: William Blount of Tennessee (1797), Senate Cases, supra note 36, at 3;
Jefferson Davis, Albert G. Brown, Stephen R. Mallory, David L. Yulee, Clement C. Clay,
Benjamin Fitzpatrick, Robert Toombs and Judah P. Benjamin (1861), id. at 27; James M.
Mason, Robert M. T. Hunter, Thomas L. Clingman, Thomas Bragg, James Chestnut, Jr.,
A. 0. P. Nicholson, William K. Sebastian, Charles C. Mitchel, John Hemphill and Louis T.
Wigfall (1861), id. at 28; John C. Breckenridge (1861), id. at 29; Jesse D. Bright (1862), Id.
at 30; Waldo P. Johnson (1862), id.; Trusten Polk (1862), id. at 31. There is some question
whether Senators Davis, Brown, Mallory, Yulee, Clay, Fitzpatrick, Toombs and Benjamin
were technically expelled. See id. at 27.
In 1877 the Senate annulled the expulsion of William K. Sebastian. 2 Hinds, supra note 20,
§ 1243.
51. See note 37 supra.
52. Senate Cases, supra note 36, at 30 n.8.
53. An eleventh Senator, John H. Mitchell of Oregon, was accused of conspiracy to de-
fraud the United States and accepting bribes (1905) but died before the Senate could act.
2 Hinds, supra note 20, § 1278; Getz, supra note 2, at 88.
54. John Smith (1807), Senate Cases, supra note 36, at 4; Lazarus W. Powell (1862), Id.
at 31; Benjamin Stark (1862), id. at 34; Robert M. La Follette (1917), id. at 110.
The resolution to expel Senator Smith was narrowly defeated and he subsequently resigned.
The resolutions to expel Senators Powell and Stark were defeated. Senator La Follette was
cleared of all charges and no expulsion vote was taken by the Senate.
5. James F. Simmons (1862), Senate Cases, supra note 36, at 32; James W. Patterson
(1873), id. at 52-54; Charles H. Dietrich (1904), id. at 98; Joseph R. Burton (1906), Id. at
99; Burton K. Wheeler (1924), id. at 113. In the case of Simmons, the Selate committee
which investigated the charges recommended expulsion but Simmons had resigned his seat
before the next session of the Senate began. As for Patterson, he was defeated for reelection
CONGRESSIONAL SELF-DISCIPLINE
archy that countenanced and encouraged polygamy and united church and
state contrary to the spirit of the constitution .... 'll
2. House of Representatives
In contrast to the Senate, the House of Representatives has used the
power of expulsion rarely. Only three members have been expelled-all on
the ground of treason. 7 Various House investigating committees have
often recommended expulsion of a member only to have the full House vote
censure instead. 58 In these situations, however, the offenses alleged did in-
volve official, rather than private misconduct-namely, bribery or the sale
of appointments to military academies. 9
A word must be said about a number of cases in which a house of Con-
gress has, in effect, "expelled" a seated member by a majority vote, rather
than by a two-thirds vote. When a question arises about a member's valid
election or eligibility for office, even after his seating, Congress has tradi-
tionally treated such a question as one of exclusion rather than one of ex-
pulsion. Thus, by a vote of 14 to 12, and after he had sat in Congress for
one year, Albert Gallatin's election to the Senate was declared void because
he had not been a citizen for nine years as required by the Constitution.c°
Similarly, the House of Representatives found that William Vandever
was not entitled to his seat because he had accepted an office incom-
patible with his position in the House."' Although analogous in certain
respects to cases of expulsion, these cases are properly treated as exclu-
sions because they involve questions of eligibility for office, which is the
focus of Congress' power to exclude.
I. EXCLUSION
Article I, section 5, clause 1 of the Constitution provides: "Each House
shall be the judge of the elections, returns and qualifications of its own
before the Senate could consider the committee report recommending expulsion. Senator Bur-
ton resigned before the Senate committee filed a report. Both Senators Dietrich and Wheeler
were cleared of the charges brought against them.
56. Senate Cases, supra note 36, at 97-98.
57. They were: John W. Reid and John B. Clark, both of Missouri, and Henry C. Burnett
of Kentucky (1861). 2 Hinds, supra note 20, §§ 1261-62. John B. Clark had never taken
his seat, however, and was technically excluded by a two-thirds vote rather than expelled.
58. Getz, supra note 2, at 85-87.
59. Id.
60. Senate Cases, supra note 36, at 1. For other instances of "exclusions" of seated
Senators, see the cases of James Shields, id. at 14, James Harlan, id. at 21, and John P.
Stockton, id. at 38.
61. (1863). 1 Hinds, supra note 20, § 504. It should be noted that the Speaker of the
House overruled a point of order objecting to the exclusion resolution on the ground that
expulsion was the proper penalty in the case of a seated member. For other cases of House
"exclusions" of seated members, see id. §§ 486-87.
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Members." Since it may judge the qualifications of its members and the
regularity of their elections, Congress may obviously exclude someone not
properly elected or not having the requisite qualifications of membership.
Exclusion differs from expulsion in two important procedural respects.
First, a prospective member must be excluded, while a member who has
taken his seat must be expelled."2 Second, a prospective member may be
excluded by a simple majority, while a seated member must be expelled
by a two-thirds vote. Exclusion and expulsion, then, "are not fungible
proceedings. ' ' 3 As with expulsion, however, there are definite limita-
tions, both procedural and substantive, on Congress' power to exclude.
A. Procedural Restraints
Although a member under threat of expulsion may have a more estab-
lished right to participate in proceedings brought against him, a prospective
member should be given the same procedural rights in an exclusion pro-
ceeding. 4 The people's right to be represented by whomever they choose
should not be treated cavalierly. Before excluding a prospective member,
Congress should afford him not only the right to participate fully in the
debate but also whatever procedural rights are needed to prepare a proper
defense.
B. Substantive Restraints
Exclusion is not included in the list of disciplinary powers in Article I,
section 5, clause 2 of the Constitution, but rather is implied in the election
provision of clause 1. It is incidental "not to Congressional discipline but
to the final authority of Congress over the process of its Members' elec-
tions."65 The framers of the Constitution provided for exclusion by a simple
62. See text accompanying notes 60-61 supra.
63. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 512 (1969).
64. See notes 18-21 supra and accompanying text. Brigham H. Roberts, who was excluded
from the 56th Congress for polygamy, was permitted to speak in his own defense (1899). I
Hinds, supra note 20, § 474. During the committee hearings on his exclusion, Adam Clayton
Powell requested that he be given "(1) notice of the charges pending against him, including a
bill of particulars as to any accuser; (2) the opportunity to confront any accuser, to attend
all committee sessions where evidence was given, and the right to cross-examine all witnesses;
(3) public hearings; (4) the right to have the Select Committee issue its process to summon
witnesses for his defense; (5) and a transcript of every hearing." The Committee stated that
it had given Powell notice of the matters it would investigate, that he and his counsel could
attend all hearings and that the committee would call witnesses on Powell's written request
and supply a transcript. Hearings on H.R. Res. 1 Before the Select Committee Pursuant to
H.R. Res. 1, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 54-59 (1967). See also Note, The Power of a House of
Congress to Judge the Qualifications of Its Members, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 673, 675 n.13 (1968).
65. Congress and the Public Trust, supra note 8, at 204.
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majority vote,66 an indication that they considered exclusion a relatively
limited power, with limited potential for abuse and political factionalism.
The grounds for exclusion specified in the Constitution relate to a member's
eligibility for office, and to the validity of his election, rather than to his
personal conduct. Congress, however, has not always respected the con-
stitutional limits on its power to exclude.
1. Grounds for Exclusion
Article I of the Constitution mentions three standing qualifications for
membership in Congress: age, citizenship and residency. Section 3 of that
article provides that "[n] o person shall be a Senator who shall not have
attained to the age of thirty years, and been nine years a citizen of the
United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an inhabitant of that
State for which he shall be chosen." As for the House of Representatives,
Article I, section 2 provides: "No person shall be a Representative who
shall not have attained to the age of twenty-five years, and been seven
years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be
an inhabitant of that State in which he shall be chosen." A fourth constitu-
tional requirement, as noted by the Supreme Court in Roudebush v.
Hartke"s is that the member be elected.69
In addition to the qualifications for Congressional membership listed in
the Constitution, it has been argued that the Constitution also lists certain
disqualifications for membership. 70 Thus, a person is disqualified from
membership in Congress if he has been impeached,"' if he holds any other
office under the United States,72 if he was elected by a state not having a
republican form of government, 3 if he refuses to take an oath or affirma-
tion to support the Constitution,74 or if after taking such an oath to support
66. Prior to 1787, English and colonial antecedents support the conclusion that both ex-
pulsion and exclusion could be effected by a majority vote. See Powell v. McCormack, 39S
U.S. 486, 536 (1969).
67. See the remarks of James Madison in the text accompanying note 28 supra.
68. 405 U.S. 15 (1972).
69. Id. at n.23. The Supreme Court cites the seventeenth amendment as the source of
this requirement for membership in the Senate. The same qualification for House membership
could be inferred from article I, section 2, clause 1 of the Constitution.
There seems to be some authority that mental capacity may be implied as a fifth qualifica-
tion. See 1 Hinds, supra note 20, § 441, (Senate investigation of the sanity of a Senator-elect).
70. Dionisopoulos, A Commentary on the Constitutional Issues in the Powell and Related
Cases, 17 J. Pub. L. 103, 111-15 (1968), [hereinafter cited as Dionisopoulos].
71. US. Const. art. I, § 3.
72. Id. arL I, § 6.
73. See Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 42 (1849).
74. U.S. Cost. art. VI.
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the Constitution, he engages in insurrection or rebellion or gives aid and
comfort to the enemy.75 Although in Powell, the Supreme Court refused to
rule whether any or all of these disqualifications were in fact negative re-
quirements for membership,"8 there seems to be ample textual evidence to
conclude that they were intended to be. Congress has in the past relied
on these "disqualifications" in excluding a member-elect. Thus, Represen-
tative Vandever was excluded because he accepted another office under the
United States; 78 Victor Berger was held not qualified to take his seat in the
House of Representatives because he allegedly gave aid and comfort to the
enemy after having taken an oath to support the Constitution;"7 and Wil-
liam Fishback and Elisha Baxter of Arkansas were denied Senate seats be-
cause at the time no republican government could be reestablished in
Arkansas due to the continuation of armed hostilities8 0 Although there
seems to have been no case where an elected Senator or Representative had
been previously impeached or refused to take the oath to support the Con-
stitution, the credentials of Senator Smoot of Utah were challenged because
he allegedly had already taken a religious oath "of such a nature and char-
acter as that he is thereby disqualified from taking the oath of office re-
quired of a United States Senator." '81
2. Exclusion Generally Does Not Involve Questions
of Personal Misconduct
One difference between exclusion and expulsion is readily apparent: the
grounds for exclusion should rarely cause a house of Congress to inquire
into a prospective member's personal misconduct.8 2 Either house of Con-
gress would be hard put to justify a character investigation under the guise
of determining proper age, citizenship or residency. Whether an elected
75. Id. amend. XIV, § 3.
76. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 520 n.41 (1969).
77. See Hobbs, supra note 16, at 14748.
78. Vandever had become a colonel of the Ninth Regiment Iowa Volunteer Infantry. I
Hinds, supra note 20, § 504. For a discussion of other instances where accepting other offices
disqualified one from being a member of Congress, see Dionisopoulos, supra note 70, at 111-13.
79. (1919). Id. at 115.
80. (1864). Senate Cases, supra note 36, at 35.
81. (1903). Id. at 98.
82. Another difference might involve the evidence needed to prove each type of allega-
tion. Generally, although by no means always, the relevant evidence needed in an exclusion
proceeding will be documentary proof of age, citizenship and residency. In expulsion cases,
the evidence required will usually be more elaborate, involving testimony of witnesses as In
a courtroom. See 1 Hinds, supra note 20, §§ 424-25, for an instance where the House of Rep-
resentatives permitted "parol evidence to prove the naturalization of a Member who could
produce neither the record of the court nor his certificate of naturalization." Id. at § 424.
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representative has been previously impeached, holds a second government
job or refuses to take the oath of office are likewise questions requiring
rather limited inquiry. Even Congress' little-used power to refuse admis-
sion to representatives of states not having a republican form of govern-
ment could not reasonably support an investigation into personal miscon-
duct of these representatives, but only into the governmental structure
under which they were chosen. In all of these instances, exclusion is used
to enforce the eligibility requirements listed in the Constitution but not to
discipline a member-elect for personal misconduct.
There are two exceptions to this rule, however. In determining whether
to exclude a member-elect who has not been properly elected or who has
given aid and comfort to the enemy in contravention of his oath, Congress
may have to judge personal misconduct. On several occasions, Congress,
as supreme board of elections, has investigated suspected misconduct of a
winning candidate.m1 In the cases of Frank L. Smith of Illinois and William
S. Vare of Pennsylvania, the Senate went so far as to refuse them their seats
because of the exorbitant amount of money spent in their campaigns."4
Victor Berger was excluded because his pacifist activities allegedly gave
aid and comfort to the enemy in contravention of his oath.' In these in-
stances, the power to exclude was used as a disciplinary sanction. It should
be noted, however, that these exceptions do have a narrow scope. For in-
stance, in order to exclude a winning candidate for election improprieties,
the exclusion must result from misconduct that directly affected the elec-
tion, such as fraud or bribery.86 It would be impermissible for Congress to
inquire into a candidate's conduct not directly connected with the election.
3. Congress' Power to Require Qualifications for Membership
in Addition to Those Listed in the Constitution
In Powell v. McCornuzck the Supreme Court clearly held that neither
Congress nor any house thereof can establish qualifications in addition to
those already contained in the Constitution. 7 The history of the debates at
the Constitutional Convention gives some support to this interpretation. At
the Convention, a committee report proposed that Congress should have
83. See, e.g., Senate Cases, supra note 36, at 142-44.
84. (1926). Id. at 119-23.
85. (1919). See Dionisopoulos, supra note 70, at 115.
86. See Senate Cases, supra note 36, at 124. The Senate exonerated Arthur R. Gould of
all charges of fraud and stated that "the transaction had no relation to his election to the
Senate."
87. 395 U.S. 486, 550 (1969).
Similarly the states may not impose additional qualifications on Congressional eligibility,
see 1 Bfinds, supra note 20, §§ 413-17.
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the power "to establish such uniform qualifications of the members of each
House, with regard to property, as to the said Legislature shall seem ex-
pedient. 88 Gouverneur Morris moved to strike out the words "with regard
to property," thus in effect permitting Congress to establish any qualifica-
tions it deemed expedient.8" Madison objected, arguing that if Congress
could establish qualifications, "it can by degrees subvert the Constitution
... by limiting the number capable of being elected.... Qualifications
founded on artificial distinctions may be devised by the stronger, in order
to keep out partisans of a weaker faction."90 When the issue came to a vote,
Madison's position prevailed by a vote of seven states to four. Similarly,
the Convention defeated the property qualification by a vote of seven states
to three.9"
In denying Congress the power to establish discretionary qualifications
for members, the framers were following earlier state constitutional pre-
cedents. Although prior to 1787 state constitutions specified many qualifica-
tions for membership in the legislature (such as age, residence, religion,
property, etc.) there is "no instance in which a State Legislature, having
such a provision in its Constitution, undertook to exclude any member for
lack of qualifications other than those required by such Constitution." 2
Subsequent history also strengthens this conclusion. At least four con-
stitutional amendments have been proposed which would add to the qualifi-
cations specified in the Constitution.93 Clearly if Congress already had the
power to set its own qualifications, there would be little reason to attempt
to amend the Constitution.
In summary, although in certain limited situations exclusion serves a
disciplinary function, exclusion is more an incident of Congress' power as
supreme board of elections than of its power as guardian of congressional
ethics.
C. Exclusion Cases in the Senate and the House of Representatives
Both houses of Congress, but particularly the House, have tended to
view exclusion as a wider disciplinary power than a close study of the Con-
stitutional provisions would warrant.
88. Warren, supra note 28, at 418.
89. Id. at 420.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 421.
92. Id. at 423. For authority that Congress was given unlimited power to fix qualifications
by the Constitution, see id. at 423-24 n.1.
93. Id. at 421 n.1. One was to make officers and stockholders of the Bank of the United
States ineligible, three were to make government contractors ineligible.
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1. Senate
As supreme board of the election of its members, the Senate has properly
investigated the election conduct of various Senators-elect. For instance, in
1926, the Senate excluded two Senators-elect for exorbitant campaign ex-
penditures94 and, in 1946, investigated charges of racism in Theodore
Bilbo's successful campaign to be elected Senator from Mississippi 0
In another context, the Senate by a majority vote in 1868 refused to per-
mit Phillip F. Thomas of Maryland to take his seat because he had "'vol-
untarily given aid, countenance, and encouragement to persons engaged
in armed hostility to the United States.' "96 Although there was no evidence
of a prior oath, the language of the fourteenth amendment disqualifying
one who gives aid and comfort to the enemy in contravention of his oath
would probably permit this use of the exclusion power.
There was less justification, however, for the attempted exclusion of
Senator William Langer of North Dakota in 1942.1' By a vote of 13 to 3,
the Senate Committee on Privileges and Elections voted to exclude Langer
after hearings on charges of moral turpitude embracing kickbacks, accep-
tance of a bribe, and conversion of proceeds of legal settlements. The full
Senate, however, rejected its committee's resolution to exclude. The Consti-
tution does not permit a house to refuse to seat a member for these reasons.
Even to allow a Senate committee to assume jurisdiction of such a case was
improper.
2. House of Representatives
The House of Representatives' use of the exclusion power has generally
been more questionable than the Senate's. Three examples will bear this
out. In 1870 Representative B.F. Whitemore, who had resigned when cen-
sured by the House for selling appointments to a military academy, was
excluded after his reelection in a special election." Brigham Roberts was
excluded in 1899 for polygamy,9 and Adam Clayton Powell was excluded
in 1967 for various offenses, including the misuse of public funds and the
making of false reports on the expenditures of foreign currency to the Com-
mittee on House Administration."' In each of these cases, the House un-
constitutionally excluded a member-elect for ethical reasons.
94. See text accompanying note 84 supra.
95. Senate Cases, supra note 36, at 142-44. See also Getz, supra note 2, at 97.
96. Senate Cases, supra note 36, at 40.
97. Id. at 140-41.
98. 1 Hinds, supra note 20, § 464.
99. Id. §§ 474-80.
100. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 492 (1969). The Powell case was unfortunately
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III. PUNISHMENT
Article I, section 5, clause 2 of the Constitution provides: "Each House
may... punish its Members for disorderly behavior ... " Of the three
disciplinary powers available to Congress, the power to punish for dis-
orderly behavior is the broadest in scope but the least drastic in effect.
A. Types of Punishment
Before proceeding with a discussion of the grounds for punishing a mem-
ber, the types of permissible punishments should be catalogued.
1. Censure
By far the most common method of Congressional punishment is the
censure. Although in form a mere resolution of the particular house repri-
manding the member for his misconduct, the censure is not an innocuous
sanction, having contributed to subsequent election defeats of various
members. 101 In all, twenty-three members of Congress have been censured,
fifteen in the House and eight in the Senate. 10
2. Suspension
Unlike exclusion and expulsion, suspension entails only a temporary loss
of floor privileges (including the right to vote) but not a member's seat it-
self.1 0 3 The only recorded instance of an attempt by the Senate to suspend
members occurred in 1902 when Senators McLaurin and Tillman were
censured for fighting on the floor of the Senate. 04 Suspension poses some
special problems which have undoubtedly limited its use. During the period
of suspension, a member's constituents are deprived of the services of their
representative without the power to send someone else in his place. Suspen-
sion then robs a segment of the population of its right to congressional rep-
resentation. 0 5
clouded with charges of indiscretions in the Congressman's private life, and with counter-
charges of racism and discrimination.
101. For example, censure was a contributing factor in the election defeats of Senators
Hiram Bingham (1932) and Thomas Dodd (1970).
102. See Getz, supra note 2, at 84-89.
103. See 2 Hinds, supra note 20, § 1665.
104. See id. Recently a House committee recommended that a member be stripped of his
voting rights. See text accompanying note 2 supra.
105. The seriousness of suspension was emphasized by a statement made by a President
Pro Tempore of the Senate: "The chair desires to say that on Monday last be requested the
clerks not to call the names of the two Senators from South Carolina, they being by a reso-
lution of the Senate in contempt of the body. On Tuesday he requested the clerks to read the
names in the event there was a roll call. He did this not because he doubted in the least the
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3. Imprisonment
It has been argued that "[t]raditional forms of punishment used in
criminal law were probably within the contemplation of the framers when
they used the term 'punish' ..... 106 Although imprisonment has never
been used by Congress, the Supreme Court has remarked that in a proper
case imprisonment of a member would be a permissible punishment.,"'
Since certain activities of a Senator or Representative are insulated from
the courts,108 Congress should have the power to adjudicate and punish
criminal violations in these protected areas. Of course, imprisonment of a
member would prevent him from carrying out his duties to his constituents
and raise problems similar to those discussed under suspension.
4. Fine
Prior to 1969, no member of either the House or the Senate had ever
been fined or lost his salary. In the Powell imbroglio, however, the House
imposed a $25,000 fine and ordered it paid by monthly salary deductions of
$1,150.11 The power to fine is a traditional penal sanction and reasonably
inferable from the power to punish. It may be a particularly appropriate
punishment where a member would not be affected by the more traditional
vote of censure.
5. Loss of Seniority
The loss of seniority is a severe punishment for a Senator or a Repre-
sentative. "[Seniority] is more than a means of choosing committee
chairmen; it is a means of assigning members to committees, of choosing
subcommittee chairmen and conference committee members. It affects the
deference shown legislators on the floor, the assignment of office space,
even invitations to dinners.""10 Two types of seniority, however, must be
distinguished. There is general congressional seniority and party seniority.
Only office assignments depend on congressional seniority; party seniority
determines committee chairmanships and assignments."' Thus when Adam
propriety of the action he took on Monday. He did it because he recognized that it was a
grave question, and he preferred to be in a position where, if it again arose, it could be by
him submitted to the decision of the Senate and thus relieve the chair from the responsi-
bility." Id.
106. Congress and the Public Trust, supra note 8, at 210.
107. Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 189-90 (1880).
108. See note 9 supra.
109. Powell v. McCormack, 395 US. 486, 563 n.7 (1969).
110. G. Goodwin, Jr., The Seniority System in Congress, in Congressional Reform, Prob-
lems and Prospects 178-79 (J. Clark ed. 1965).
111. Congress and the Public Trust, supra note 8, at 207 (footnote).
For example, House committee chairmen are chosen in the following manner. Rule 10 of
1972]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
Clayton Powell was deprived of his seniority by the full House in 1969,
what was taken away was his general House seniority."' His party senior-
ity and the chairmanship of the House Education and Labor Committee
had previously been taken from him by the House Democratic Caucus.n
Thus, loss of seniority, while a most effective party sanction, is a relatively
weak congressional sanction.
6. Adverse Publicity
Although not a formal punishment voted by the Senate or House, an
investigation of a member's conduct is in itself something of a punish-
ment.'14 The adverse publicity attendant upon such an investigation can
seriously damage chances for reelection. Whether he had been ultimately
censured or not, the mere investigations into Senator Thomas Dodd's con-
duct undoubtedly prejudiced his chances for reelection.
B. Procedural Restraints
1. Punishment as Compared to Expulsion and Exclusion
The critical difference between the power to punish and the power to
expel or exclude lies in the very nature of the penalty. Expulsion or ex-
clusion deprives a member of his seat in Congress, while punishment does
not. Like exclusion, however, a simple majority may punish; but unlike
exclusion, the Constitution does not specify, beyond the use of the term
"disorderly behavior," the reasons for which these punishments may be
the Standing Rules of the House states: "At the commencement of each Congress, the House
shall elect as chairman of each standing committee one of the Members thereof . . . ." In
actual fact, the House simply ratifies the decisions which have already been made by the
Democrats or Republicans in their respective houses. The sole determining factor in that party
determination is seniority. See J. Lindsay, The Seniority System, in House Republican
Task Force on Congressional Reform and Minority Staffing, We Propose: A Modern Con-
gress 23 (1966).
112. See H.R. Res. 2, 91st Cong., 1st Sess, (1969).
113. Congress and the Public Trust, supra note 8, at 206.
On January 2, 1965 the Democratic caucus of the House of Representatives had denied
seniority rights to Representatives John B. Williams of Mississippi and Albert W. Watson of
South Carolina "for having campaigned for Senator Barry M. Goldwater, the 1964 Repub.
lican candidate for the Presidency." Goodwin, supra note 110, at 10.
This article does not analyze the nature of party sanctions available to either the
Democrats or Republicans in Congress. In addition to depriving a member of seniority In
the Democratic or Republican ranks, a party could encourage a primary challenge to the
member and limit his access to campaign funds distributed by party campaign committees.
114. Both the Senate and the House of Representatives have established their own ethics
committees with power to investigate personal misconduct and recommend appropriate
action to the full body. See note 22 supra.
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imposed. In fact, the Constitution does not even mention the types or
forms of punishment which may be employed by Congress.
2. Due Process Considerations
As with exclusion and expulsion, Congress should not mete out punish-
ment, of whatever form, in an arbitrary fashion."" An argument can be
made that from the point of view of a member's constituents, the grant of
procedural rights in a punishment proceeding is at least as important as
in an expulsion or exclusion proceeding. In these latter situations, if con-
victed, a member will be deprived of his seat, thereby giving his constit-
uents an opportunity to choose a new representative. Punishment, how-
ever, will not cause the seat to be vacated, but will undoubtedly curtail a
member's effectiveness in Congress and thereby his ability to represent
his constituents.
C. Substantive Restraints
1. Grounds for Punishment: Prior Misconduct
Congress' reluctance to expel a member for prior misconduct has not
prevented it from punishing a member for prior offenses,"' presumably
because punishment of a member for past offenses does not seriously
invade the privilege of the people to elect their own representatives. It
would seem, however, that Congress should punish a member for prior
misconduct only if the offense would have been considered "disorderly
behavior" at the time committed.
2. Disorderly Behavior
Article I, section 5 of the Constitution permits each house to punish its
members for "disorderly behavior." If the framers of the Constitution
left the term "disorderly behavior" purposely vague, both the Senate and
House have begun to give it meaning in recently enacted codes of ethics."'
Standing Rule XLIII of the House of Representatives requires, inter alia,
that a member conduct himself at all times in a manner which shall
reflect creditably on the House; to adhere to the spirit and letter of the
rules of the House and its committees; to receive no compensation from
115. For John Quincy Adams' demand for the benefit of sixth amendment protection in
a censure proceeding, see 2 Hinds, supra note 20, § 1255. For a description of what pro-
cedural rights might be warranted, see text accompanying notes 21-25 supra.
116. Getz, supra note 2, at 90. See 2 Hinds, supra note 20, § 1236; note 33 supra.
117. See the Senate and House Ethics Codes, cited in Congress and the Public Trust,
supra note 8, appendix D. The impetus for the creation of the Codes of Ethics dates back
to the Senate investigation of Robert Baker in 1964. The cases of Senator Thomas Dodd
and Congressman Adam Clayton Powell gave additional urgency to the project. For a brief
history of the creation of these Codes, see id. at 216-21.
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any source, the receipt of which would occur by virtue of influence im-
properly exerted from his position in Congress; to accept no gift of sub-
stantial value from any person or organization having a direct interest in
legislation before the Congress; to accept no honorarium for a speech,
writing or other activity in excess of the usual and customary value for
such services; and to keep his campaign funds separate from his personal
funds." 8 The House Committee on Standards of Official Conduct is em-
powered to investigate alleged violations of this code "or of any law, rule,
regulation, or other standard of conduct applicable to the conduct of [a]
Member . . . in the performance of his duties or the discharge of his
responsibilities . . . , I After such investigation it may recommend ap-
propriate action to the full House.
The Senate's Select Committee on Standards and Conduct is empowered
to receive all "complaints and investigate allegations of improper conduct
which may reflect upon the Senate, violations of law, and violations of
rules and regulations of the Senate, relating to the conduct of individuals
in the performance of their duties as Members of the Senate .... "12o It
may also recommend appropriate disciplinary action to the Senate as a
whole. 2 '
If these codes of ethics signal the beginning of a definition of "disorderly
behavior," three things should be noted. First, the rules of both the House
and Senate permit punishment of a member for conduct which might
reflect badly on the particular house. In the Senate, it is called "improper
conduct which may reflect upon the Senate.'1 22 In the House, it is called
conduct which does not reflect creditably on the House of Representa-
tives. -3 Second, each house may punish for violations of law but only if
those violations occur in the performance of a member's official dities. '2"
Presumably unlawful conduct which is not office-related is not punishable
unless it may be considered conduct which tends to discredit a particular
house. Third, while the House makes the violation of any of its rules
punishable as a breach of its code of conduct, 12 the Senate seems to
118. Id. at 268.
119. Rule XI (19), id. at 271.
120. S. Res. 338 § 2(a), 88th Cong., 2d Sess., 110 Cong. Rec. 16939 (1964), cited In
Congress and the Public Trust, supra note 8, at 266.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Rules of the House of Representatives, Rule XLIII(1), cited in Congress and the
Public Trust, supra note 8, at 268.
124. See Congress and the Public Trust, supra note 8, at 228-30.
125. See Rules of the House of Representatives, Rule XI(19), cited in Congress and the
Public Trust, supra note 8, at 271.
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punish only violations of its rules which are office-related.2 6 Realistically,
however, it might be difficult for a Senator to argue that a violation of a
Senate rule was not by its very nature office-related. A study of the actual
instances when Congress has punished a member shows that, while both
houses have generally followed these guidelines, the Senate and House
have on occasion used this power differently.
D. Punishment Cases in the Senate and
House of Representatives
1. Senate
In the Senate, punishment for "disorderly behavior" has almost uni-
versally been for conduct which, while not unlawful, reflects badly on the
Senate or violates its rules. In addition, the proscribed conduct has almost
exclusively taken place in the Senate itself or in one of its committees.
Thus in the eight cases of senatorial censure, four Senators were punished
for fighting on the floor of the Senate, -7 one for revealing confidential
information, 12 8 and one for placing a paid lobbyist on the staff of a sub-
committee . 29 The last two Senators to be censured were Senators Joseph
McCarthy in 1954, and Thomas Dodd in 1967.
Senator McCarthy was censured on two counts: (a) for his non-
cooperation with and abuse of the Subcommittee on Privileges and Elec-
tions of the Committee on Rules and Administration during a 1952
investigation of his conduct as a Senator and (b) for abuse of the Select
Committee to Study Censure. 30 Senator Dodd was censured because his
conduct was supposedly contrary to accepted morals, detracted "from
the public trust expected of a Senator," and tended "to bring the Senate
into dishonor and disrepute."'' The censure resolution also alleged that
he had "[exercised] the influence and power of his office . . . to obtain,
and use for his personal benefit, funds from the public through political
testimonials and a political campaign .... 3 2 Dodd represents the only
Senator censured for conduct which was not directly connected with the
workings of the Senate.
126. See S. Res. 338 § 2(a)(1), 88th Cong., 2d Sess., 110 Cong. Rec. 16939 (1964), cited
in Congress and the Public Trust, supra note 8, at 266.
127. Thomas H. Benton of Missouri and Henry S. Foote of Mississippi (1850), Senate
Cases, supra note 36, at 15-16; John L. McLaurin and Benjamin R. Tillman of South
Carolina (1902), id. at 94-97.
128. Benjamin Tappan of Ohio (1844), id. at 11-13.
129. Hiram Bingham of Connecticut (1929), id. at 125-27.
130. Id. at 152-54.
131. Congress and the Public Trust, supra note 8, at 226.
132. Id. at 226-27.
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2. House of Representatives
While the Senate censures for conduct which reflects discredit upon
that body, the House has usually censured members for conduct which
was both illegal and office-related. Of the fifteen instances of House cen-
sures, six cases have involved either bribery or the sale of appointments
to military academies.' 33 In all of these cases, the House committee
investigating the facts voted or would have voted to expel; the full House
chose rather to censure. 13 4 Two Representatives have also been censured
for speaking allegedly treasonable words. 185 The House, however, has
in some cases censured for conduct which tends to discredit it. These cases
have generally involved the use of unparliamentary language; 180 one
Representative, however, was censured for having placed an obscene
letter in the Congressional Record. 17 As for types of punishment other
than censure, the House has fined and stripped one of its members of
seniority for allegedly misusing public funds. 3 8
IV. CONCLUSION
From this analysis, it is clear that definite procedural and substantive
rules do exist to guide Congress in the exercise of each of its disciplinary
powers. Members are in no sense at the "unbridled discretion" of their
colleagues. Congress has begun to show increased sensitivity towards
criticism of the conduct of its members, and recent instances of alleged
misconduct by certain members of Congress may result in Congress'
disciplining members more frequently than in the past. Thus the limita-
tions on Congress' power to expel, to exclude and to punish are likely to
come under increased scrutiny.
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